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Abstract
In public procurement a temporal separation of award and actual contract-
ing can frequently be observed. In this paper we give an explanation for this
institutional setting. For incomplete procurement contracts we show that such
a separation may increase eﬃciency. We show that eﬃciency can be increased
by post-award, pre-contract negotiations between the award-winning seller
and one of the ‘losing’sellers. Surprisingly, the eﬃciency gains can be higher
if the award is given to a seller with a lower reputation for quality instead
of to a seller with higher reputation. Under certain conditions post-award,
pre-contract rent-seeking activities also increase eﬃciency. This is always the
case if the procurement agency is corrupt, but may also occur in the case of
lobbying. (JEL D23, H57, L51)
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Public procurement amounts to 10-15 percent of the GDP in the US and in Western
European countries. The overall eﬃciency of an economy, therefore, is decisively
inﬂuenced by the eﬃciency of the procurement procedure. This paper explores the
consequences of a temporal separation of award and actual contracting in public
procurement. In such a setting the award is the government’s oﬃcial statement of
the intention to buy a particular seller’s project. The contract on this project is
signed later, maybe with another seller. The separation of award and contract gives
higher-quality sellers a better chance to become contractor because disappointed
oﬀerors can sue for the contract, whereas according to European law they can only
sue for monetary compensation if award and contract are uniﬁed. In countries like
France, Belgium and Italy award and actual contract have been separated for a long
time. Other countries, like Germany, will have to introduce such a separation because
in 1999 the European Court of Justice explicitly ruled that a temporal separation of
award and contract is required.1 The EU favors such a separation because it makes
it more diﬃcult for a procurement agency to discriminate foreign oﬀerors, which
would contradict the common-market philosophy. In the US federal procurement,
there is no explicit distinction between award and actual contracting. However, in
the Federal Acquisition Regulations (FAR) there is a provision which may result in
a timing of potential sellers’ legal protection which is equivalent to a separation of
award and actual contracting. “A particular subject of interest concerns whether and
how a disappointed bidder or a pleased but challenged awardee wage their struggle
if the protest of the award halts proceeding with the contract.” (Tiefer and Shook,
1999, p. 496)2 Therefore, although award and actual contracting are uniﬁed in the
FAR, a post-award ( = post-contract) protest may lead to a termination of the
initial contract, thus eﬀectively separating award and contract.
Why can a separation of award and actual contracting improve eﬃciency? Consider
a situation where a government agency wants to procure a project from one of
two potential private sellers. The value of the project is q if the agency signs the
contract with the right seller and zero otherwise. Unfortunately, for one reason
or another, the agency chooses the wrong contractor with a probability of (1 −
x). Thus, the expected value of the project is xq. The agency has an interest to
1The judgment of the European Court of Justice, October 28, 1999, is an interpretation of the
Council Directive 89/665/EEC.
2For details see FAR, §14.408-8 (sealed-bid auction), §15.507 (contracting by negotiation) and
§33.104 (c)(4)(5) (protests after award).
1improve the probability that the right seller is chosen, for instance from x to z>x .
This can be attained by a separation of award and contract because this enables
the potential sellers to negotiate after one of them has got the award. As will be
shown in this paper, these negotiations increase the probability that the right seller
signs the contract. Inﬂuencing the sellers’ negotiations may require quite unexpected
strategies of the agency: it is the most challenging result of this paper that it might
even be optimal if the agency gives the award to the seller which looks inferior. It is
possible that such a strategy should be chosen because it makes it more probable that
in their negotiations the sellers choose the right one and this may overcompensate
the initial disadvantage of giving the award to the inferior looking seller. If the
agency dispenses with this strategy, it wastes an important channel to inﬂuence the
outcome of negotiations between the sellers.
Recall the general insight of Coase (1960) that the allocation of property rights is
irrelevant from an eﬃciency point of view as long as transaction costs are negligible
and contracts are perfect. Otherwise, if the contractual arrangements do not allow
the exclusion of the probability of wrong decisions, the distribution of property rights
can have an inﬂuence on eﬃciency. In this paper, giving the award to one of the sellers
endows him with a speciﬁc right that shapes the sellers’ negotiations. Therefore,
a separation of award and contract can be explained as a rational institutional
arrangement in environments where decisions are necessarily imperfect. In these
cases, contractual arrangements that allow for a certain ﬂexibility will do better than
inﬂexible contractual arrangements. In this paper, contracts with built-in ﬂexibility
will be called “self-correcting mechanisms.” The separation of award and contract
in public procurement is a prominent example of such a mechanism. However, the
main idea of the paper carries over to all kinds of contractual arrangements that
suﬀer from imperfections.
Flexibility becomes important if it is impossible to avoid mistakes in the selection
of a trading partner. This intuition, straightforward as it is, might be objected to
on purely theoretical grounds: despite contractual incompleteness the procurement
agency could use a direct mechanism, that is, an auction to select the “right” trading
partner. In such an ex-ante auction a better type would be able to make a higher
oﬀer. Consequently, ﬂexibility could not improve upon this solution. However, an
auction will only operate successfully if the quality of the project can precisely be
speciﬁed ex ante.3 In contrast, our paper applies to projects where quality can only
poorly be speciﬁed ex ante.
3Compare Teece (1988).
2The poor speciﬁability of quality is the reason why in practice public procurement
only rarely has the structure of an auction, and if it has, in general it would not be
an optimal mechanism. In the US, for example, it is not the sealed-bid auction, but
competitive negotiation which “is by far the most common method by which the
government purchases products and services with a value in excess of the simpliﬁed
acquisition threshold of $ 100,000.” (Tiefer and Shook, 1999, p. 77) Real-world
procurement contracts suﬀer from imperfections most of the time and it is for this
reason that ﬂexibility becomes important. In this paper we want to contribute to a
better understanding of these practical contracts. It is not the purpose of this paper
to derive conditions which show how far auctions can approach an eﬃcient solution
of the allocation problem in the case of poorly speciﬁable quality.4
We will analyze the following situation. Two sellers compete for a public project
that one of the sellers will eventually carry out. The contract should be signed with
the highest-quality seller, as corresponds to a setting of negotiated procurement
(whereas procurement by sealed-bid auction always is based on price). When the
award is given, each seller knows the quality of his project but not the quality of
the other seller’s project, whereas the procurement agency does not observe either
quality. However, the agency and the other seller observe a signal which refers to
the reputation of the seller and which is positively correlated with the quality that
is achieved if the project is carried out by this very seller.
When the award is given, each seller is better informed about his quality than the
procurement agency. Thus, there are potential gains from negotiations between both
sellers that cannot be utilized if the agency immediately signs the contract with the
award-winning seller. However, these potential gains can be utilized whenever the
result of sellers’ post-award pre-contract negotiations depends on who got the award.
Assume that each seller can credibly commit to a strategy in a game which is to be
played before an authority entitled to revoke the award – this could be an arbitrator,
the procurement agency itself, or a court. The sellers’ strategies can serve as signals
for the revocation authority which may induce the authority to rescind the award. –
One might argue that a separation of award and contract is not necessary to bring
about eﬃciency increases by negotiations between potential sellers. Alternatively,
the sellers could negotiate before award and contract are simultaneously enacted.
However, ﬁrst, this is not always possible: the potential rival sellers may not know
each other before the award, which trivially makes pre-award negotiations impossi-
4For a more detailed discussion of the admissibility of such an applied approach see, for example,
Besley and Coate (1998).
3ble. Second, as we shall see below,5 the separation of award and contract gives the
procurement agency additional strategic ﬂexibility which cannot be replicated by
pre-award negotiations between the sellers.
Whereas pre-award negotiations typically are the sort of collusive behavior which
is unwanted in regulatory processes, the sellers’ post-award negotiations could be
seen as part of an arbitration process. The sellers meet, possibly in the presence of
an arbitrator or a representative of the procurement agency and enter into negotia-
tions. As result of the negotiations the arbitrator or the agency may receive a signal
according to which the award should be revoked because a switch to another seller
will increase eﬃciency. Note, however, that the eﬃciency-improving consequences
of post-award negotiations do also hold if the negotiations are “pure collusion.” In
this case our paper provides the message that pure collusion can be good if the in-
stitutional environment has appropriately been shaped, as is the case in our paper.
Therefore, readers who dislike the idea that sellers negotiate which strategies they
will apply before a court, should recognize that in our paper the environment of these
negotations has been set so as to guarantee that the collusion is eﬃciency-improving.
An alternative institutional setting is rent seeking. During the time between award
and contract, any seller has an incentive to engage in rent-seeking activities in order
to inﬂuence the probability that he gets the contract. Rent-seeking outlays can be
used as information about the true value of the project because – as will be shown in
this paper – high-quality sellers will engage more heavily in rent-seeking activities
than low-quality sellers. Thus, as in the case of negotiations between the sellers,
the probability of contracting with the wrong seller can be reduced. Whether the
improvement in the agency’s informational status implies an eﬃciency gain or not,
depends on the speciﬁcation of rent-seeking activities: if the activities are zero-sum
in nature (corruption), eﬃciency increases, whereas in the case of negative-sum rent
seeking (lobbying), the positive information eﬀect has to be compared with the
negative eﬀect of wasted lobbying outlays.
The paper is organized as follows: In section 2 we present the model. In section
3 we analyze the benchmark case of unseparated award and contract. In section 4
we extend the game by separating award and contracting and look for negotiations
between the sellers. In section 5 we analyze the case of rent seeking. Section 6
concludes.
5See subsection 4.2 below.
42 The model
Let us consider a situation where a government procurement agency purchases an
indivisible project. Two sellers, indexed k = i,j, oﬀer their services, but only one of
them will become the contractor. The value of the project (beneﬁt minus costs) is
qk ∈ [q,q] if the project is carried out by seller k. Abbreviating we shall denote qk
as ‘quality’ of the project and of seller k, respectively. At the contracting stage, the
procurement agency cannot observe the qualities oﬀered by the sellers. However, it
observes signals ek > 0 which can be thought of as exogenously given reputations of
the sellers.6 Therefore, the agency has to base its decision on the signals {ei,e j}.
Any signal is positively correlated with quality. Let fk(q): =f(q | ek) be the prob-
ability that a project of quality q is realized if the signal is ek and Fk(q): =F(q |
ek)=
  q
q fk(r)dr be the associated distribution function. Then for   ek ≥ ˆ ek we assume
F(q |   ek) ≤ F(q | ˆ ek). (1)
This assumption implies ﬁrst-order stochastic dominance: higher quality is more
probable, the higher a seller’s reputation signal.
We follow the incomplete-contract methodology initiated by Grossman and Hart
(1986) and Hart and Moore (1988) and applied to government contracting by B¨ os
and L¨ ulfesmann (1996, 1997). Accordingly, we assume that the reputation signals are
not veriﬁable before a court or an arbitrator (although they are common knowledge):
reputation could only be described by many characteristics, some of which cannot
actually be measured but are subjective in nature. The quality is non-veriﬁable
private information when the agency and one of the sellers sign the procurement
contract. We assume that at this moment there are so many characteristics which
can be combined into various qualities that it is too costly (or impossible) to make
contractual provisions for every single quality realization.7 However, ex post, when
the project has actually been carried out, quality becomes known to everyone and
becomes veriﬁable before a court.
We assume that the procurement agency wants to buy quality, it is not interested in
a cheap price if this implies lower quality. Unfortunately, however, it is impossible to
condition an ex-ante price on unveriﬁable private information of a seller. Therefore,
the only type of procurement contract that can be signed ex-ante speciﬁes the seller
6In an alternative setting, one could deal with signals which can be interpreted as plans or
models that specify the details of the project. Then the signals would be endogenous and the costs
of signaling would explicitly have to be considered.
7On this point see Hart and Moore (1999).
5who will carry out the project and is contingent on the events “some project is
realized” and “no project is realized.” Although this contract does not stipulate an
ex-ante price, all parties know how the ex-post payment to the private contractor
will be determined. The compensation of the seller who carries out the project will
be negotiated ex-post, after the realization of the project, when the quality of the
project is known and veriﬁable. In this paper we are not interested in the exact
process of this negotiation. We therefore follow the literature8 and assume that the
ex-post negotiated price π for the seller is some fraction α ∈ [0,1] of the value of the
project q. The remaining fraction β(= 1 − α) goes to the procurement agency. In
the following we will call βq the public value of the project. Anticipating the ex-post
negotiations, at the moment of contracting each seller knows exactly what he will
get if he becomes contractor (since he knows his own quality). The agency only
knows the expected payment it will face if signing the contract with a particular
seller.
Figure 1 presents the sequences of events which are alternatively treated in the
various sections of this paper. We deal with the following settings:
(a) As a benchmark we consider a setting where award and contract are not sepa-
rated, but uniﬁed. After the qualities and the reputation signals are given at stage 0,
the potential sellers may negotiate who makes an explicit oﬀer to the agency (date
1/2). Recall that the qualities are private information. Therefore, negotiations are
not meaningful until after the reputation signals have been announced. Afterward, at
stage 1, the procurement agency simultaneously chooses one seller and signs the con-
tract with this very seller. We denote the agency’s strategy as sG,w h e r esG ∈{ i,j}
speciﬁes the winning seller.
(b) In the alternative settings, award and contract are separated. In these cases,
at stage 1 the procurement agency gives the award to one of the sellers. Strategy
sG ∈{ i,j} speciﬁes the award-winning seller (in the following called the winner,
whereas his counterpart will be called the loser). In contrast to the benchmark case,
the contract is signed at a later stage. This raises the question of how far the award
is binding for the agency. We assume that the award binds the agency unless it is
revoked, because a “recovation uthority” (RA) receives a signal that the award was
given to the inferior-quality seller. It depends on the procurement law whether the
RA is an arbitrator, the procurement agency itself, or a court.
After the award has been announced, but before the contract is signed, the loser
8See Aghion and Tirole (1994), Che and Hausch (1999), Edlin and Reichelstein (1996) and
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Figure 1: The timing of the games.
will try to reverse the agency’s decision. To achieve this he can either enter into
negotiations with the winner, which may lead to a game played before the RA, or
he can use political channels to inﬂuence the procurement agency by rent-seeking
activities (which will of course give rise to counteractions of the winner). For con-
ceptual clarity we assume that “negotiations” and “rent seeking” are two separate
settings, although in practice they can of course occur simultaneously.
(i) Negotiations: the separation of award and contract gives free scope for negotia-
tions between the sellers. At stage 2 the loser can ask the winner to “sell” his right
to sign the contract. As a consequence of these negotiations, at stage 3 the loser can
go to the RA to claim the contract. The winner can either conﬁrm the loser’s claim
7before the RA or oppose it. The RA observes the strategies of the sellers and utilizes
them as signals. If the RA conﬁrms the award, the winner signs the contract. If the
RA revokes the award, the loser signs the contract.
(ii) Rent seeking: alternatively, the separation of award and contract may give free
scope for rent-seeking activities of the sellers at date 2. If the loser’s lobbying activ-
ities give a signal that his quality is higher than the winner’s, then the agency will
revoke the award at date 3. It should be mentioned that the same may hold true if
the agency is corrupt. (Revocation by a court or an arbitrator is of no relevance in
the case of rent seeking.)
The ﬁnal stage of the game is identical for all of the various settings of the paper:
at stage 4 the project is carried out by the contract-signing seller, for example i,i t s
quality is observed by the procurement agency and the price π = αqi is negotiated
and paid to i.
The objective functions of the players are as follows: both sellers are risk neutral
and maximize proﬁts. Procurement agency, arbitrator and court are also risk neu-
tral. They maximize the public value of the project. Detailed presentations of these
objective functions will be presented in the following sections.
3 A Benchmark
As a benchmark we analyze the situation which is treated in the standard literature
on procurement: award and contract are not separated, and there are no pre-award
negotiations between the potential sellers. We shall show that the resulting allocation
is ineﬃcient and, therefore, one has to look for remedies of the imperfection as will
be done in the sections to follow.
The procurement agency anticipates that an ex-post public value of βqk will be
accomplished at stage 4 if seller k had been chosen as contractor. Therefore, at
stage 1 the agency gives the award according to the following strategy:
sG = i ⇔ βµi ≥ βµj, (2)
where µk = E[q | ek],k = i,j, is the expected value of q given signal ek. It follows
immediately that the agency will give the award to the seller with the higher signal.9
9This follows directly from ﬁrst-order stochastic dominance and can easily be proved. We have
βµk = β
  q






. Hence, βµi ≥ βµj ⇔ β
   q
q (Fi(q) − Fj(q))dq
 
≤ 0 ⇔
ei ≥ ej. The last equivalence follows from our assumption of ﬁrst-order stochastic dominance.
8We obtain the following result:
Result 1: If award and contract are simultaneously enacted, the optimal
decision rule of the procurement agency is
sG = i ⇔ ei ≥ ej. (DR)
The expected payoﬀ of the agency is βµi.
Because of the imperfection of the quality signal ei, it cannot be expected that the
decision rule DR is perfect. In fact, the probability of making a wrong decision is









Let us now ask whether DR is the optimal decision rule given the contractual envi-
ronment analyzed in the paper: is the deviation from the ﬁrst-best allocation present
in decision rule DR due to the necessary restrictions imposed by the incomplete-
contract setting or due to an unnecessarily imperfect contract design? The latter
is correct: the decision rule DR exhibits an idiosyncratic imperfection. A ﬁrst hint
that this claim is correct is given by the observation that information is wasted with
this decision rule. Assume for a moment that the loser (w.l.o.g. called j) was to act
in the pure interest of the procurement agency. At the awarding/contracting stage
he is better informed than the agency because he knows {ei,e j,q j}, whereas the
agency only knows {ei,e j}. If he would decide according to the objective function
of the agency, his decision rule would be:
s
G




Result 2: The decision rule DR makes no use of the information held
by the sellers. If the informational advantage of the sellers could be used
in a decision rule, the expected payoﬀ of the procurement agency could
be increased. If ei ≥ ej, it would increase to max{βµi,βq j}≥βµi if the
loser decided in the pure interest of the agency.
Therefore, if we can ﬁnd a way to use the information wasted with DR,t h i sc o u l d
lead to less imperfect decision rules. In the next section, we will look for mechanisms
that make use of this information.
94 Negotiations between sellers
4.1 Award and contract separated
Let us begin with the treatment of stage 3. Without limitation of generality we
assume that seller j is the loser. The separation of award and contract allows him
either to do nothing (sj = 0) or prosecute the revocation of the agency’s initial
decision (sj = 1). The winner can either conﬁrm the loser’s position (si =1 )o r
oppose it (si = 0). The decision of the revocation authority (RA) is based on the
sellers’ strategies {si,s j}. The RA can either revoke (sRA = 1) or conﬁrm (sRA =0 )
the award. In doing so it tries to maximize the public value of the project βq.
Recall that the reputation signals {ei,e j} are not veriﬁable before a court or an ar-
bitrator. Hence, these RAs cannot revoke an award because the procurement agency
chose the seller with the inferior reputation signal. If the procurement agency itself
is RA, it knows the reputation signals. However, it has already used this information
when deciding on the award and it will revoke its own decision only if it gets new
information. Hence, despite the diﬀerence in the informational positions of court,
arbitrator and procurement agency, their revocation strategies are the same.
We claim that the following revocation strategy is optimal whatever the sellers do
at stage 2:
sisj =1 ⇒ sRA =1 , (5)
sisj =0 ⇒ sRA =0 .
As will be shown shortly, this strategy is part of a Nash-equilibrium of the game.
Note that for notational convenience the RA’s strategy has been deﬁned so as to
include ﬁctitious decisions of the RA when it is not involved because the loser is
inactive (sj =0 ) .
Given the strategy of the RA, the sellers can negotiate their strategies before going
to the RA. This is done at stage 2. At this stage the qualities are still private
information. Hence, the only possible agreement of the sellers speciﬁes a price p
paid by the loser and a pair of strategies {si,s j}. After both parties have negotiated
such an agreement, the loser approaches the RA. In order to model the negotiations
in the simplest possible way we assume that the loser makes a take-it-or-leave-it
oﬀer to the winner. This assumption has no inﬂuence on the qualitative results of
the paper.10
10Diﬀerent negotiation procedures would aﬀect the distribution of the surplus but not the al-
10We distinguish between two cases: in case (a) no seller can credibly commit to
a strategy before the RA; in case (b) the sellers can credibly commit. We apply
backward induction to solve these two cases.
(a): No credible commitment to a strategy before the RA
Stage 2: If the sellers cannot commit at stage 2, it is a (weakly) dominant strategy for
the winner to always oppose (si = 0). He knows that the loser is unable to oﬀer him
a suable amount of money which could compensate him for giving up the right to
carry out the project. Hence, he is always better oﬀ if he gets the contract (αqi > 0).
And he can guarantee himself the contract by always opposing. The strategy of the
loser does not matter. Regardless of whether he goes to the RA or not, he never
gets the contract. Since the winner can always guarantee himself the contract, even
if qi <q j, no information about the true values of qi and qj is revealed by the choice
of strategies regardless of whether the loser claims the contract or not.
Stage 1: Anticipating the strategies of the sellers, the best the procurement agency
can do is to stick to decision rule DR.
Note that the strategies chosen at stages 1 and 2 rationalize the above claim for an
optimal RA strategy: the best the RA can do, given the strategies of the agency and
of the sellers, is to conﬁrm the award (sRA = 0). This is the best possible solution
because the RA cannot extract any new information from the sellers’ strategies.
Result 3: If no seller can credibly commit to an RA strategy, the sep-
aration of award and contract cannot improve upon the decision rule
DR.
(b): Credible commitment to a strategy before the RA
Stage 2: If the sellers can commit at stage 2, for example by the deposition of a
pledge at a third, neutral party, we obtain the following optimal strategies. Since
the loser cannot observe the winner’s quality, his take-it-or-leave-it oﬀer of p is based
on the following optimization approach:
max
p prob[αqi ≤ p](αqj − p), (6)
locative eﬃciency if either some ﬁnal negotiation stage and a ﬁnal proposer are ex-ante speciﬁed
or if the surplus is divided according to some cooperative sharing rule. If negotiations are modelled
as in Hart and Moore (1988), some loss of eﬃciency is possible. This, however, would only have a
quantitative eﬀect, but no qualitative eﬀect, on our results. – Note that all qualitative results of
the paper are also valid if the winner makes a take-it-or-leave-it oﬀer to the loser.
11where (αqj − p) is what the loser gets if he succeeds and prob[αqi ≤ p]i st h e
probability that the winner accepts the loser’s oﬀer. We know that prob[αqi ≤ p]=
prob[qi ≤ p/α]=Fi(p/α), and substitute this in (6). Then, a local maximum of the
loser’s optimization problem is characterized by the following ﬁrst- and second-order
conditions:11




i(p/α)(αqj − p) − (2/α)fi(p/α) < 0, (8)
where f (·) denotes the ﬁrst derivative of f with respect to (·).
Any positive price oﬀer p(qj) > 0 is increasing in the loser’s quality as can easily be







The term SOC in the denominator denotes the second-order condition (8) which is
smaller than zero by assumption.
We will ﬁrst show that negotiations are only successful if the loser has higher
quality than the winner (qj ≥ qi). As a ﬁrst step to establish this conclusion we will
prove the following lemma:
Lemma 1: The loser has no incentive to overinvest, that is, p ≤ αqj.
Proof: Assume to the contrary that p>α q j. In this case, the loser makes a negative
proﬁt. This, however, contradicts the assumption that p is the maximum with the
highest expected proﬁt since the loser can always guarantee himself a zero proﬁt by
choosing p = 0. q.e.d.
On the other hand, the winner will only accept the loser’s oﬀer if αqi ≤ p. Therefore,
successful negotiations require that αqi ≤ p ≤ αqj, which establishes our claim:
Lemma 2: Post-award negotiations can only be successful if the award
has been given to the inferior seller.
11Note that for the results of this paper it is not necessary to require existence or uniqueness of
an interior solution. It is suﬃcient to know that (7) and (8) can be fulﬁlled for some distribution
functions and that in this case the optimal price oﬀer is implicitly deﬁned by (7). If there are
several optima, we will use the convention that the loser chooses that with the highest expected
proﬁt.
12We will next check whether post-award negotiations can implement the ﬁrst best,
that is, negotiations are successful whenever qi <q j. This, however, requires that
p = αqj since otherwise there is a strictly positive probability that qi <q j ∧p<α q i.
If p = αqj, equation (7) simpliﬁes to
−Fi(qj)=0 , (10)
which can only be fulﬁlled if the loser has the worst possible quality, qj = q.I nt h i s
case, however, there are no gains from negotiations.
Lemma 3: Although there might be gains from post-award negotiations,
these negotiations cannot guarantee the ﬁrst best.
On the other hand, for a given qj there is a probability prob[αqi ≤ p(qj)] =
Fi(p(qj)/α) that negotiations are successful. Thus, from the point of view of the
procurement agency, post-award negotiations improve upon the benchmark with
probability   q
q
Fi(p(qj)/α)fj(q)dq. (11)
The self correction of the mechanism improves upon a situation where negotiations
are excluded but the result is still imperfect.12 Figure 2 gives a graphical illustration
of the result. Assume that the loser’s quality is qj as indicated in the ﬁgure. A ﬁrst-
best solution requires that seller i signs the contract whenever qi ≥ qj,t h a ti s ,i f
quality i lies in the interval b of the ﬁgure. Vice versa, the ﬁrst best requires that
seller j signs the contract whenever qi <q j, that is, if quality i lies in the interval
a. Now assume that the award has been given to seller i. As we have proved, the
sellers’ negotiations reverse the award if αqi ≤ p ≤ αqj ⇔ qi ≤ p/α ≤ qj. Therefore,
a separation of award and contract improves upon the nonseparation if qi lies in the
interval c, that is, if the loser is considerably better than the winner. If the diﬀerence
between the sellers is small (interval m, for ‘middle’), it is still the award-winning
seller i who ends up signing the contract, despite his inferior quality. The creation of
ﬂexibility due to the separation of award and contract allows for the self-correction
of imperfect decision rules, but only if the initial decision yielded ‘large’ losses.
It remains to be shown that the RA’s revocation strategy (5) is part of a Nash-
equilibrium of the game. Assume that both parties have successfully negotiated a
price p and a pair of strategies si =1 ,s j = 1 (the loser goes to the RA and the
winner conﬁrms). In that case, the strategies reveal the information to the RA that
12This is a consequence of the impossibility theorem by Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983).
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Figure 2: Eﬃciency-improving negotiations.
qj ≥ qi.T h u s ,sRA = 1 is an optimal strategy for the RA. In all other cases, the
winner opposes, si = 0, and the RA conﬁrms the award.
Stage 1: Anticipating the sellers’ negotations and the RA’s decision rule, the optimal
strategy of the procurement agency is to give the award to the seller for whom stage
2 negotiations promise the highest ex-post payoﬀ.
Assume that the award-winning seller has a better signal, ei ≥ ej, and the procure-
ment agency gives him the award, sG = i. Then, the expected payoﬀ of the agency
is as follows: the agency always gets βµi. Furthermore, in all cases where the sellers
successfully negotiate, it gets β(qj − qi) > 0 in addition to βµi. This additional
payoﬀ results from the separation of award and contract. Its expected value can be
calculated as follows.
For a given qj, the expected value of qi given that qi ≤ p(qj)/α is
































Summarizing, an agency that always gives the award to the seller with the higher
signal (sG = i ⇔ ei ≥ ej) faces an expected payoﬀ of
G(i): =βµi + g(i). (15)
By the same procedure we can calculate the expected payoﬀ of an agency that always
gives the award to the seller with the lower signal (sG = j ⇔ ei ≥ ej):13
G(j): =βµj + g(j). (16)
We are now in the position to answer the question whether the separation of award
and contract improves the eﬃciency compared to the equilibrium of the game where
award and contract are simultaneously enacted. For this purpose we deﬁne a state
as eﬃciency-improving if it entails a higher sum of payoﬀs for all players, that is,
for the procurement agency, the loser and the winner. In our particular case, we
will always have a higher expected payoﬀ for the procurement agency in equilibrium
since G(i) >β µ i, irrespective of whether G(i) ≥ G(j)o rG(j) ≥ G(i). And the sum
total of the loser’s and the winner’s payoﬀs is also increased by the separation of
award and contract. This separation, therefore, creates a self-correcting sequential
mechanism where part of the imperfections from stage 1 is automatically internalized
by the rational behavior of the agents. Summarizing, we have the following result
(which follows immediately from backward induction):
Result 4: There exists a subgame-perfect equilibrium of the game where
award and actual contract are separated.
Let us ﬁnally turn to the explicit calculation of the equilibrium strategy of the
procurement agency. The agency should choose sG = i if and only if
G(i) − G(j) ≥ 0. (17)
Analyzing condition (17) leads to the following result:
13g(j)i se q u a lt og(i) after interchanging the indices i and j.
15Result 5: It may be optimal for the procurement agency to give the
award to the seller with the inferior signal.
This result is surprising because it demonstrates that a strategy may be optimal
which at ﬁrst glance seems to be inferior. The formal proof of result 5 has been
relegated into appendix A.
What is the intuition for this result? Without any post-award negotiations, the
procurement agency loses β(µi−µj) by giving the award to j, the seller with the lower
signal. However, this loss can be overcompensated by the sellers’ negotiations. If
these negotiations attained the ﬁrst best, that is, corrected mistakes from the award
stage perfectly, the optimal award strategy of the agency would be indeterminate
from an eﬃciency point of view. However, negotiations cannot guarantee the ﬁrst
best, thus, in the award stage the procurement agency has to compare the relative
losses which result from giving the award to either one or the other ﬁrm. Negotiations
are more likely to be successful the larger the diﬀerence between the sellers’ qualities.
If both qualities are close, the mechanism is unable to pick the right seller. However,
self correction takes place if the initial mistake is relatively large. Therefore, the
procurement agency can rely on the fact that it will end up signing the contract
with the ‘right’ seller if qi is large and qj small or, alternatively, if qi is small and qj
large. Hence, the agency only has to care about the ‘intermediate’ ranges where the
qualities are relatively close. In this intermediate area the contingent expected value
of qj might be larger than the contingent expected value of qi despite the fact that the
opposite is true for the unconditional expected values.
4.2 Comparison of post-award and pre-award negotiations
It is result 5 which constitutes the merit of the separation of award and contract.
This can best be shown as follows. Assume that the potential sellers have known
each other for some time so that it cannot be argued that the separated award is
beneﬁcial because it informs the potential sellers of their rivals. Now compare the
following two settings:
(S) Separation of award and contract; post-award, pre-contract negotiations
between the potential sellers are possible;
(U) Uniﬁed award/contracting stage; pre-award negotiations are possible.
If U always attained the same result as S, there would be no reason to separate
award and contract.
16In U, whatever the sellers negotiate, the procurement agency cannot do better
than to choose the seller who signals the higher expected quality. Anticipating this
decision rule, seller j will know that he will not get the award/contract if µi ≥ µj.
However, it is possible that this seller oﬀers a price p that induces seller i not to
apply for the contract. An inspection of the strategic incentives of the two sellers
reveals that this would be the same optimization approach as treated in equation
(6) for S, that is, it may be optimal for seller j to oﬀer p = p(qj) and this oﬀer is
accepted by seller i if αqi ≤ p(qj). However, the equivalence of the two optimization
approaches does not prove that U always attains the same result as S.R e s u l t5
constitutes the decisive diﬀerence. The approach S gives the procurement agency
an additional strategic instrument which reveals itself in the agency’s possibility
to give the award to an agent with inferior signal, because the agency knows that
the initial ‘mistake’ will be taken care of by the self-correcting property of the
mechanism. This self correction and its strategic advantages do not exist in U.
In other words: in U the procurement agency can only become active after the
sellers’ negotiations. However, in S, the agency has one more move which it makes
before the sellers’ negotiations. Giving the award to a seller with inferior signal is a
strategic move which is based on the possibility of the procurement agency to act
twice. This contractual structure cannot be replicated by pre-award negotiations
between the potential sellers.14
Let us present this intuition in a more formal way, assuming that the negotiations
are always opened by the seller who did not get the award.15 Then, in U the pre-
award negotiations are always opened by the seller j whose µj <µ i. However, in
S, because of the procurement agency’s additional strategy instrument, the post-
award negotiations may occasionally be opened by a seller who has not been given
the award although his quality indicator µ exceeds that of his rival. In this case,
the roles of j and i are exchanged, a price p = p(qi) is oﬀered which is accepted by
seller j if αqj ≤ p(qi). This shows how the agency’s additional strategy shapes the
negotiations, and since we have shown that it may be welfare-improving to grant the
14Nothing changes if in S the potential sellers negotiate both before the award and after the
award. The pre-award negotiations in this case would still have to consider the self-correcting
mechanism, that is, the possibility that an award is given to a seller with an inferior signal.
15The result extends to the case where the (potential) winner makes a take-it-or-leave-it oﬀer. It
is, therefore, robust with respect to the choice of the ﬁrst mover as long as the same game structure
is used for both pre-award and post-award negotiations. The intuition for this result carries over
to all cases where the award decision has an inﬂuence on the outcome of the negotiations between
the sellers.
17award to an inferior seller, S is superior to U. This can be summarized as follows:
Result 6: A separation of award and contract is eﬃciency improving
compared to a situation where award and contract are uniﬁed.
5 Rent seeking
The gap between the awarding and the contracting stage could also be used for
rent-seeking activities in order to change the ex-ante decision of the procurement
agency.16 The sequencing of the game in this case has been presented in Figure
1 above. It is the same as in the previous section with one decisive exception in
stage 2, where both sellers can engage in rent-seeking activities at costs Rk,k= i,j.
These activities inﬂuence the probability x(Ri,R j) that the contract is signed with
the award-winning seller (once again i). Following the literature on rent seeking, we
distinguish between corruption and lobbying:17
• Assume ﬁrst that the procurement agency gets a payment of Ri + Rj if the
sellers engage in activities of Ri,R j, that is, rent seeking is zero-sum in nature.
This case of rent seeking corresponds closely to what might be called corruption
of the agency.
• Assume second that the activities Ri,R j are wasted, that is, rent seeking is
negative-sum in nature. This case of rent seeking is more closely related to the
common-sense interpretation of lobbying.
Comparing both types of rent seeking shows immediately that corruption ceteris
paribus leads to a higher level of welfare because nothing is wasted. On the other
hand, corruption is seen as morally condemnable and, therefore, is explicitly forbid-
den in almost every country.
5.1 Equilibrium strategies
The equilibrium strategies of the agency and of the sellers are the same for both
types of rent seeking. Therefore, this subsection holds true for both corruption and
16For the modelling of rent-seeking contests see Dixit (1987), Baik and Shogren (1992) and
Nitzan (1994).
17See Hillman and Riley (1989), Hillman and Samet (1987), K¨ orber and Kolmar (1996), Nitzan
(1994).
18lobbying; their treatment need not be separated until it comes to the normative
evaluation of the consequences of rent-seeking activities.18
At stage 3 the procurement agency announces the ﬁnal contractor and signs a con-
tract with this seller. We assume that the agency uses the following decision rule in





1i f Ri ≥ Rj
0i f Ri <R j
(DR
∗). (18)
As will be shown shortly, this decision rule is part of a Nash equilibrium of the game.
DR∗ is based on the fact that Rk is higher, the higher the seller’s quality: since the
gross proﬁt at stake, αqk, is higher for the high-quality seller, in equilibrium he
always spends more on rent seeking than the inferior-quality seller as we will prove
shortly. Hence, Rj >R i reveals the information to the agency that qj >q i,s ot h a t
the award should be revoked and the contract signed with the high-quality seller
j.19 Note that the winner i has the advantage that he will become the contractor if
Ri = Rj. Hence, we have an asymmetric contest of the sellers.
It is plausible to assume a sequential bargaining structure at stage 2: the loser, who
wants a revocation of the award, has to make the ﬁrst move (stage 2a). The winner
follows after observing the loser’s rent-seeking activity (stage 2b). Both sellers an-
ticipate the agency’s decision rule DR∗. Applying backward induction, we calculate
the sellers’ optimal rent-seeking expenditures.





αqi − Ri if Ri ≥ Rj
−Ri if Ri <R j
. (19)







Rj if αqi ≥ Rj
0i f αqi <R j
. (20)






αqj − Rj if Rj >R i
−Rj if Rj ≤ Ri
. (21)
18See subsections 5.2 and 5.3 below.
19The award-winning low-quality seller, in such a case, cannot sue the agency for compensation
because his quality is not veriﬁable before a court or an arbitrator and he never enters stage 4 of
the game where quality becomes veriﬁable.
19However, since he cannot observe the winner’s expenditures Ri, he can only ﬁnd his
own optimal expenditures by maximizing his expected proﬁt Πj:
Πj = prob[Rj >R i]αqj − Rj. (22)
This expectation still contains the unobservable variable Ri. However, the loser’s
probability of winning the contest can be rewritten as follows. We know from the
winner’s reaction function that prob[Rj >R i]=prob[Rj >α q i]=Fi(Rj/α). There-
fore, the loser solves the following optimization problem:
max
Rj
Πj = Fi(Rj/α)αqj − Rj (23)
under the restrictions that Rj ≥ 0a n dFi(Rj/α)αqj − Rj ≥ 0. Appendix B gives a
proof of the following lemma that characterizes the loser’s optimal strategy:20
Lemma 4: The loser’s optimal strategy is either R∗
j = 0 or the optimum
is characterized by R∗
j > 0 ∧ fi(R∗
j/α)qj =1 .
The lemma is intuitive: whenever the loser engages in rent seeking, he will invest
until the marginal return on investment is equal to the marginal costs. Marginal costs
are equal to 1 whereas the marginal return on investment is equal to the increase in
the probability of winning the contest (1/α)fi(Rj/α) times the gross proﬁt αqj.
In the following we have to distinguish between two cases: in the ﬁrst, R∗
j =0i st h e
equilibrium strategy for the loser. In this case, the winner always spends R∗
i =0a n d
wins the contest. No information is revealed and the best the procurement agency
can do is to stick to the DR∗ strategy. Hence, a separation of award and contract
is neutral with respect to the eﬃciency of the resulting allocation.
In the second case, R∗
j > 0 is the optimal strategy for the loser. For this case we
prove the following lemma:
Lemma 5: The loser has no incentive to overinvest, that is, R∗
j ≤ αqj.
Proof: Assume to the contrary that R∗




j < 0. However, this contradicts the assumption that R∗
j
is a maximum, since the loser can always guarantee himself a zero proﬁt by choosing
Rj = 0. q.e.d.
20The problems of existence and uniqueness of an interior solution are qualitatively identical to
those mentioned in footnote 11 for the case of negotiations. For details see Appendix B.
205.2 The case of a corrupt procurement agency
We are now in the position to prove the following result:
Result 7: A separation of award and contract is eﬃciency-improving if
rent-seeking activities have the character of corruption.
Proof: If R∗
j = 0, nothing changes compared to the situation where award and
contract are not separated. If R∗
j > 0, we get
R
∗








j if αqi ≥ R∗
j
0i f αqi <R ∗
j (winner’s strategy).
We have to prove the following statements: a) the award is revoked if and only if
this is a change for the better; in other words, whenever the contract is signed with
the loser, the loser has the higher quality, b) the procurement agency sticks to its
strategy DR∗ and c) there is a strictly positive probability that the award is revoked.
In order to prove a) we have to distinguish two cases:
1. R∗
j > 0,R ∗
i =0 .I nt h i sc a s ew eh a v eαqj ≥ R∗
j >α q i and, therefore, revoking
the award is always a change for the better.
2. R∗
j > 0,R ∗
i = R∗
j. In this case the award is never revoked.
We can therefore conclude that revoking the award always leads to an eﬃciency
improvement. This implies immediately that DR∗ is optimal for the procurement
agency (which proves statement b). Finally, let us turn to the proof of statement c):
what is the probability for the case R∗
j > 0a n dR∗
i = 0? The ﬁrst-order condition






i (1/qj)= :αφ(qj), (24)
where φ(qj) is a shorthand for f
−1
i (1/qj). Therefore, for given qj the probability for
R∗
j >α q i is prob[αqi <α φ (qj)] = prob[qi <φ (qj)] = Fi(φ(qj)). Thus, the probability
of an eﬃciency-improving revocation of the award is equal to
  q
q
Fi(φ(qj))fj(qj)dqj > 0. (25)





















Figure 3: Eﬃciency-improving rent-seeking activities.
Figure 3, which is qualitatively similar to ﬁgure 2, illustrates the result. Again,
a separation of award and contract improves upon the nonseparation if qi lies in
the interval c,22 that is, if the loser is considerably better than the winner. If the
diﬀerence between the sellers is small, the mechanism is unable to correct the initial
error. The main intuition carries over from the case of negotiations: the creation of
ﬂexibility due to the separation of award and contract allows for the self-correction of
imperfect decision rules, but only if the initial decision would have yielded substantial
losses.
The result follows the same intuition as in the case of negotiations: the separation
of award and contract successfully reduces the probability of decision errors if these
errors would have implied relatively large losses. If, on the other hand, qi and qj
are relatively close, the separation has no positive inﬂuence on the eﬃciency of the
21The inversion of the density function is well-deﬁned because Πj is strictly convex in an envi-
ronment around R∗
j.
22The sellers’negotiations reverse the award if αqj ≥ αφ(qj) >α q i ⇔ qj ≥ φ(qj) >q i.
22allocation. The procurement agency’s decision of whom to give the award therefore
depends on the contingent expected value of the projects in the ‘intermediate’ ranges
where the projects of both sellers have relatively similar qualities. Without giving a
formal proof of this claim we can therefore conclude that there are cases for which
it is reasonable for the procurement agency to give the award to the low-quality
seller because his performance contingent on a restricted interval of q exceeds the
performance of the other seller despite the fact that his overall performance is worse.
5.3 The case of lobbying
Let us ﬁnally turn to the analysis of rent-seeking contests where the investments
are pure lobbying. The equilibrium strategies of the players are not aﬀected by this
change of interpretation, but the normative implications are. This is due to the fact
that lobbying outlays are pure waste. We therefore have to calculate gains and losses
explicitly.
The expected gain of a separation of award and contract is equal to the expected
diﬀerence of the value of the game where award and contract are separated and the














The expected lobbying outlays for a given qj,Σ R,a r eαφ(qj)+prob[αqi ≥
αφ(qj)]αφ(qj). Recall that prob[αqi ≥ αφ(qj)] = 1 − Fi(φ(qj)). Therefore, the ex-








If a separation of award and contract leads to lobbying activities of both sellers, the
resulting equilibrium is eﬃciency-improving if
E[∆] − E[ΣR] > 0. (28)































Because of 0 ≤ Fi(·) ≤ 1, the ﬁrst term is positive, and the second term negative.
Thus, the eﬀect on net proﬁts is ambiguous, and we conclude as follows:
23Result 8: In contrast to the case of corruption, a separation of award and
contract is not necessarily eﬃciency-improving if rent-seeking activities
have the character of lobbying.
6C o n c l u s i o n
The frequently used practice to separate award and contract in public procurement
is a prominent example of what we have called self-correcting mechanism:t h ee x -
ante imperfection of a procurement agency’s decision can at least partly be oﬀset
because potential sellers obtain scope for negotiations or rent-seeking. It was shown
that a separation of award and contract is eﬃciency-improving if the sellers can
commit to the outcome of their negotiations or if the fraction of the total value of
the public project that is wasted through the rent-seeking contest is not too large.
However, it is unclear whether the welfare losses due to the degree of imperfection
of negotiations or the welfare losses due to wasted lobbying outlays are worse.
Surprisingly, the expected public value of the project may be maximized if the award
is given to a seller with an inferior quality signal. The intution for this result is as
follows: negotiations or rent seeking will correct a wrong ex-ante decision if the
quality of the award-winning seller is very low whereas the quality of the loser is
very high. Thus, the expected payoﬀs of diﬀerent awarding strategies diﬀer only with
respect to intermediate values of project quality. It can be the inferior seller who
has a better contingent performance for these intermediate values despite the fact
that his unconditional expected value for product quality is below that of the other
seller.
Summarizing, we obtained a relatively robust result with respect to the eﬃciency-
improving eﬀects of self-correcting mechanisms, regardless of whether the agents
use the time-span between award and contract for negotations, lobbying, or even
corruption.
Appendix A
P r o o fo fr e s u l t5
The procurement agency should choose sG = i if and only if
G(i) − G(j) ≥ 0. (1)
We will now consider an example that demonstrates that both sG = i and sG = j
may be optimal if ei >e j.L e tq ∈ [0,1] be the support of the value of the project
24and Fk(q)=qek,k = i,j, be the class of admissible distribution functions with
associated density functions fk(q)=ekqek−1,k= i,j,f o rek ∈ (0,∞).
We will ﬁrst compute the optimal oﬀers of the losing sellers in the post-award ne-


















and analogously for pi. The contingent expected values of giving the award to i and



















































We denote by ∆G the diﬀerence [G(i) − G(j)]/β. First, we calculate this diﬀerence
for ej =1 ,t h u sµj =1 /2, and ei →∞ . Since limei→∞µi = 1 and limei→∞µ
ei
i =1 /e,
where e is Euler’s number, we obtain
∆G =( 1 − 1/2) + lim
ei→∞


















12 − 12α + α2
24
> 0, (4)
because α ∈ [0,1].
25Second, we calculate the above diﬀerence for ei =1 ,t h u sµi =1 /2, and ej → 0.
Since limej→0 µj =0w eo b t a i n
∆G =( 1 /2 − 0) +















By the intermediate-value theorem there is a nonempty subset {ej,ej}∈(0,∞)a n d
a critical value ecrit
i ∈ (0,∞) for every ej ∈{ ej,ej} such that for all values of ei
above ecrit
i the award should be given to the seller with the inferior signal and vice
versa. q.e.d.
Appendix B
Proof of lemma 4
The Lagrangean of the loser, seller j,i s
L = Fi(Rj/α)αqj − Rj + λRj + µ(Fi(Rj/α)αqj − Rj), (1)
which yields the following Kuhn-Tucker ﬁrst-order conditions:
Rj :( 1 + µ)(fi(Rj/α)qj − 1) + λ ≤ 0 ∧ Rj ≥ 0
∧ Rj ((1 + µ)(fi(Rj/α)qj − 1) + λ)=0 , (2)
λ : Rj ≥ 0 ∧ λ ≥ 0 ∧ λRj =0 , (3)
µ : Fi(Rj/α)αqj − Rj ≥ 0 ∧ µ ≥ 0 ∧ µ(Fi(Rj/α)αqj − Rj)=0 . (4)
These conditions give rise to 33 possible cases which in turn have to be analyzed.
There are two qualitatively diﬀerent types of solutions that have to be distinguished:
First, Rj = 0 may turn out to be optimal. This leads directly to part 1 of lemma
4 irrespective of the speciﬁcation of parameter values. Second, Rj > 0 may turn
out to be optimal. Then fi(Rj/α)qj − 1 = 0 has to be fulﬁlled. Note that this
result holds both for interior and for corner solutions. For Rj > 0, conditions
(2) require (1 + µ)(fi(Rj/α)qj − 1) = 0,23 and since µ ≥ 0, this always implies
fi(Rj/α)qj − 1 = 0, regardless of whether we have an interior solution where
Fi(Rj/α)αqj − Rj ≥ 0 is not binding (µ = 0), or we have a corner solution where
Fi(Rj/α)αqj − Rj =0 ,a n dµ>0. q.e.d.
23λ = 0 in this case, as can be seen from conditions (3).
26Technical details
Since the winner’s density function enters the ﬁrst-order condition fi(R∗
j/α)qj =1 ,i t
is not guaranteed that the Kuhn-Tucker conditions characterize a unique maximum.
Due to its lack of structure the condition might characterize a local minimum and
even if it characterizes a maximum, it need not be unique. In order to characterize
a local maximum we need (1/α)f 
i(R∗
j/α)qj ≤ 0a tR∗
j. Fortunately, we do not
require existence or uniqueness of an interior solution in this context. All we need
is R∗
j > 0 ∧ fi(R∗
j/α)qj = 1 for every local maximum. If there are several ones, we
will use the convention that the loser chooses that with the highest expected proﬁt
Πj.
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